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CHEH-CHENG WANG EX REL. THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. FMC 
CORP.: FALSE CLAIMS ACT BAR MAY BE 
OVERTURNED BY PENDING LEGISLATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Wang ex ret. The United States v. FMC Corp./ the 
Ninth Circuit held that a private individual (a qui tam plaintiff) 
cannot base a suit on behalf of the government under the False 
Claims Act2 on publicly known information unless she played a 
role in making the allegations public. In doing so, the court af-
firmed dismissal of a suit brought by an engineer who had direct 
and independent knowledge of the information underlying the 
allegations. The court stated that "[q]ui tam suits are meant to 
encourage insiders privy to a fraud on the government to blow 
the whistle on the crime. In such a scheme, there is little point 
in' rewarding a second toot."3 
The Ninth Circuit's holding is controversial. The False 
Claims Amendments Act of 1992, passed by the House in Au-
1. Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992) (per Poole, J.; the other panel 
members were Fletcher, J., and Nelson, J.). 
2. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1986). 
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gust, 1992,· is incompatible with it. This note considers Wang in 
the light of prior and pending legislation. 
II. FACTS 
Dr.1I Cheh-Cheng Wang worked as a mechanical engineer for 
FMC for fourteen years.s He was fired' in 1986. Wang claimed 
he was fired because he disclosed violations of the False Claims 
Act by FMC to the California Department of Fair Employment 
and Housing and to Congressman Norm Mineta.8 FMC claimed 
Wang was terminated for good cause, stating that his perform-
ance was below standard9 and that his attitude at work was arro-
gant and condescending. lo Wang sued FMC, as a qui tam plain-
tiff, for violations of the False Claims Act. The district court 
dismissed the suit, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion because Wang was not the original source of the informa-
tion in his complaints.ll 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. BACKGROUND 
The phrase qui tam comes from the Latin expression qui 
tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, 
which means "who brings the action for the king as well as for 
himself."12 The qui tam plaintiff, called a relator, receives an 
award (such as a percentage of the amount recovered) for suc-
cessfully prosecuting the suit.13 The rest of the recovery goes to 
4. H.R. 4563, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. 138 CONGo REC. H7978 (1992). At time of writ-
ing, this bill is still before the Senate Judiciary Committee, not yet passed by the Com-
mittee or by the Senate. 
5. Brief of Appellee FMC Corporation in Opposition to Appellant's Opening Brief 
on Appeal at 6 [hereinafter FMC's Brief]. 
6. Appellant's Corrected Opening Brief on Appeal at 3-4. 
7. Wang V. FMC Corp., 975 F. 2d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir. 1992). 
8. FMC's Brief at 5. 
9.Id. 
10. Id. at 7. 
11. Wang V. FMC Corp., No. C-87-20814-WAI, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6683 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 23, 1991). 
12. Erickson V. American Inst. of Bio. Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908, 909 n.l (E.D. Va. 
1989) (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 160 (1768». 
13. Congress' grant of a financial interest in the recovery is the basis for the plain-
tiff's standing in these actions. There have been several unsuccessful challenges of the 
2
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the government.14 Qui tam suits were' conducted in English 
courts as early as the Fifteenth Century. III However, these suits 
are creatures of statute, not common law.16 Thus, a federal 
court's jurisdiction to hear a qui tam complaint is determined by 
the statute establishing the qui tam cause of action. 
1. The False Claims Act of 1863: All Plaintiffs Welcome 
The False Claims Act was originally enacted in 1863 to com-
bat rampant fraud by wartime contractors.17 The statute pro-
vided criminal and civil penalties, including double damages and 
a $2000 forfeiture per violation. IS "Any person" could bring a 
qui tam suit under the Act.19 The successful relator was entitled 
to a 50% share of the recovery.20 The Supreme Court has noted 
that the 1863 Congress intended the phrase "any person" to be 
interpreted broadly: even the District Attorney who prosecuted 
a criminal action against a fraudulent defendant could become 
the civil qui tam complainant.21 
standing of qui tam plaintiffs. Interesting discussions appear in James B. Helmer, Jr. & 
Robert Clark Neff, Jr., War Stories: A History of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False 
Claims Act, the 1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act, and their Applications in 
the United States ex rei. Gravitt v. General Electric Co. Litigation, 18 OHIO N.V. L. 
REV. 35 (1991); Frank A. Edgar, Jr., Comment, "Missing the Analytical Boat": The Un-
constitutionality of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, 27 IDAHO L. REV. 
319 (1991); Thomas R. Lee, Comment, The Standing of Qui Tam Relators Under the 
False Claims Act, 57 V. CHI. L. REV. 543 (1990); Evan Caminker, The Cons,titutionality 
of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 251 (1989). 
14. See supra note 13. 
15. Sherr v. Anaconda Wire & Cable Co., 149 F.2d 680, 681 (2nd Cir. 1945). 
16. United States ex rei. Rodriguez v. Weekly Publications, 144 F.2d 186, 188 (2d 
Cir. 1944) (qui tam awards under the Act (then popularly known as the "informer stat-
ute") were "of statutory creation ... wholly within the control of Congress"). See also 
United States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 (1943) (history of courts showing 
disfavor to such suits); Marra v. Burgdorf Realtors, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 1000, 1012-13 
(E.D. Pa. 1989) (same). 
17. Helmer & Neff, supra note 13 at 36; Richard J. Oparil, The Coming Impact of 
the Amended False Claims Act, 22 AKRON L. REV. 525, 526 (1989). 
18. United States ex rei. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1153 (3d Cir. 
1991). Stinson's majority opinion by Sloviter, C.J., and. dissent by Scirica, J., both pro-
vide scholarly reviews of the history of the False Claims Act. The history of the 1863 
version of the Act also comes under particular scrutiny in the majority (Black, J.) and 
dissenting (Jackson, J.) opinions of United States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 
(1943). 
19. Marcus, 317 U.S. at 546. 
20. Id. at 539. 
21. Id. at 546 (citing CONGo GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., 955-956. (1863». 
3
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In the 1930's and early 1940's, several qui tam lawsuits were 
filed that capitalized on rampant fraud by depression-era and 
wartime government contractors.22 These complainants did 
nothing to' expose the fraud and provided no independent 
knowledge of the fraud. 23 Instead, they would copy the allega-
tions from a criminal complaint filed by the government and use 
them as the basis for their own qui tam action. This was a new 
use of the Act.2' In 1943, Attorney General Biddle characterized 
these actions as "parasitic."2G In United States ex. rel. Marcus 
v. Hess, the key case of this period, Justice Jackson explained26 
that this practice limited the Government's ability to control 
criminal actions while providing a windfall to undeserving plain-
tiffs. Further, the law would become "downright vicious and cor-
rupting"27 if police, prosecutors' or other government investiga-
tors could file suit as relators based on what they had learned on 
the job.28 The Court's majority recognized these and further is-
sues as '~strong arguments of policy,"29 but concluded that "the 
trouble with these arguments is that they are addressed to the 
wrong forum. Conditions may have changed, but the statute has 
not. "30 Relief had to come from Congress. 
2. The 1943' Amendments: Bar for Information in Possession 
of the Government 
Congress responded to Marcus with amendments to the 
Act. The House initially passed a bill to repeal the False Claims 
Act.31 The original Senate bill barred qui tam suits that were 
based on information in the possession of the goverment, unless 
the information on which the suit was based was "original with 
such person."32 Congress adopted the Senate bill, but without 
22. S. REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5266,5275. 
23. [d. at 10-11 (1986), 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5275-5276. Several such cases are listed 
infra note 36. 
24. Marcus, 317 U.S. at 559. 
25. United States ex reI. John Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 321 (2d Cir. 
1992). , 
26. 317 U.S. at 556-62 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
27. [d. at 560. 
28. [d. 
29. Marcus, 317 U.S. at 546. 
30. [d. at 547. 
31. Stinson, supra note 18, at 1153. 
32. [d. (quoting 89 CONGo REC. 510, 744 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1943». 
4
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the original source exception.33 This clause was dropped 
"without explanation."84 As a result, no one (except the federal 
government) could bring a qui tam action if the government al-
ready knew about the underlying fraud.31! 
The initial effects of the amendment were as expected. 
Courts dismissed several suits in which the plaintiff relied on 
information already collected by the government. 86 
However, the 1943 bar also excluded legitimate actions. The 
first hint of mischief came in 1949.37 The plaintiff in this case 
charged fraudulent claims by a business and corruption of the 
involved government officials. "The learned District Judge 
thought that, because plaintiff did not negative knowledge of the 
fraud on the part of government officials, but on the contrary 
charged their knowledge and complicity in the fraud, the court 
was without jurisdiction to entertain the suit."38 The appellate 
court reversed: the guilty knowledge of wrongdoing government 
employees will not be imputed to the government for the pur-
pose of barring a suit against the wrongdoers.39 
33. S. REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5266,5277. 
34. [d. Few court opinions provide any explanation for the dropping of the clause, 
but in United States v. Aster, 176 F. Supp. 208, 210 (E.D. Pa. 1959), aff'd, 275 F.2d 281 
(3rd Cir. 1960), cert. denied, Aloft' v. Aster, 364 U.S. 894 (1960). Hastie, J., cited com-
ments by Senator Langer, 89 CONGo REC. 10746-51, and Senate rejection of a corrective 
amendment, 89 CONGo REC. 10752, to show that this was a debated issue, not an accident. 
35. S. REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,5277-78. 
36. See, e.g., United States ex. rei. Greenberg v. Burmah Oil Company Ltd., 558 
F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 967 (1977) (no jurisdiction when the suit is 
based on government-possessed information, not even on the basis of plaintiff's public 
service in assembling, organizing and integrating the information in the government's 
possession); United States ex. rei. Bayarsky v. Brooks, 154 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1946) (use-
ful summary of the 1863 statute's legislative history and the 1943 amendments); Sherr v. 
Anaconda Wire & Cable Co., 149 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1945) (not an unconstitutional taking 
of the relator's property to eliminate subject matter jurisdiction, including jurisdiction 
over ongoing suits, for qui tam suits based on information in the possession of the gov-
ernment); United States ex rei. Rodriguez v. Weekly Publications, Inc., 144 F.2d 186 (2d 
Cir. 1944) (Congress has the right to change the terms of qui tam suits even for suits in 
progress); United States ex rei. McLaughlin v. American Chain & Cable Co., 62 F. Supp. 
302 (S.D. N.Y. 1945) (no jurisdiction to hear qui tam suit when all material information 
elicited by the government, and no fees to relator for drawing the complaint). 
37. United States v. Rippetoe, 178 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1949). 
38. [d. at 736. 
39. [d. at 738. 
5
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The Rippetoe court also expressed doubt that Congress in-
tended the bar against suits based on information already 
known to the government to apply to the informer who gave 
that information to the government. 40 
Later decisions disagreed with the Rippetoe dictum. For ex-
ample, in United States v. Aster,41 in 1960, the Third Circuit 
ruled against an informer who sued under the False Claims Act 
after the government failed to do anything with the evidence he 
provided.42 The informer's suit was barred because it was based 
on information (that he had provided) in the possession of the 
United States prior to the filing of the suit.43 "The appellant 
here chose to impart his material information to the United 
States for its use rather than first bringing an action on his own 
initiative ... By doing so he has brought himself within the ju-
risdictional prohibition. "44 
Aster was followed for the next 26 years: to be able to bring 
a qui tam suit, a person who knew about a fraud had to file the 
complaint without first reporting the details to the 
government.411 
United States ex rei. Wisconsin v. Dean was a particularly 
disconcerting example of this line of cases. Wisconsin success-
fully prosecuted the defendant in a state court criminal action 
for making fraudulent claims for Medicaid reimbursements. The 
40. [d. at 736. 
41. 275 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 894 (1960). 
42. [d. 
43. [d. at 283. 
44. [d. 
45. United States ex rei. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984) (dis-
cussed infra); United States ex rei. Weinberger v. Florida, 615 F.2d 1370 (5th Cir. 1980); 
Safir v. Blackwell, 579 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 943 (1979) (ex-
presses strong reservations about the rule but applies it because it is the law); Pettis ex 
rei. United States v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 577 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1978) (United States 
has no ethical duty to warn an informer that he will lose the right to file a qui tam action 
if he divulges his evidence to the government); Oklahoma ex rei. Department of Human 
Servo V. Children's Shelter, Inc. 604 F. Supp. 871 (W.O. Okla., 1985); United States ex 
rei. Lapin V. International Business Machines Corp., 490 F. Supp. 244 (D. Haw. 1980) 
(once informer has given the information to the government, she is barred from bringing 
suit even if the government makes no effort to investigate or take action). 
Contrary court decisions were rare: United States ex rei. Davis V. Long's Drugs, Inc., 
411 F. Supp. 1144 (S.D. Cal. 1976), broke with this rule but was overruled on this ground 
by Pettis. 
6
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state then brought a civil suit to recover damages under the 
False Claims Act in federal court, on behalf of the United 
States.4e The United States declined to appear in the suit, leav-
ing Wisconsin in control of the action.47 In its statement of dec-
lination to the district court, the United States said that Wis-
consin had "a special expertise" in investigating this type of 
fraud and was "the proper party to conduct this action."4s The 
. Seventh Circuit then ruled the suit barred because Wisconsin 
had already given the evidence of fraud to the United States. 
This bar was a trap for the unwary honest citizen.49 By 
1986, there were only about six qui tam cases per year:~o "Qui 
tam actions under the [False Claims Act] had gone in forty 
years from unrestrained profiteering to a flaccid enforcement 
tool."61 Fraud, however, was still rampant - the Senate Report 
on the False Claims Amendments Act described the problems of 
fraud by government contractors as follows: 
Most fraud goes undetected. Of the fraud that is 
detected . . . the Government prosecutes and re-
covers its money in only a small percentage of 
cases .... The Department of Justice has esti-
mated fraud as draining 1 to 10 percent of the en-
tire Federal budget, . . . costing taxpayers any-
where from $10 to $100 billion annually .... DOD 
[Department of Defense] loses more than $1 bil-
lion just from fraudulent billing practices.Gi 
46. Wisconsin, 729 F.2d at 1102. 
47. Before the 1986 amendments, when a private plaintiff brought a False Claims 
Act suit, the United States was required to either appear in the suit and completely take 
over prosecution of it, excluding the plaintiff from further participation in the suit, or to 
decline to appear, leaving all prosecution for the qui tam plaintiff. S. REP. at 25, 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5290. Section 3730 (c)(l) of the amended (1986) False Claims Act allows 
the qui tam plaintiff to continue as a party, subject to a few restrictions. [d. 
48. Wisconsin, 729 F.2d at 1103. 
49. Pettis, 577 F.2d at 673. 
50. H.R. REP. No. 1015, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 173 (1991). 
51. United States ex rei. John Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 321 (2d Cir. 
1992). 
52. S. REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986) reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5266, 5267 (citations omitted). 
7
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3. Jurisdiction After 1986: The Original Source Requirement 
In 1986, in order to encourage more qui tam suits,1I3 
Congress revised the jurisdictional bar in the False Claims Act. 
Section 3730(e) of the Act lists the restrictions. II. 
The section relevant to Wang v. FMC is 3730(e)(4): 
(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action 
under this section based upon the public disclos-
ure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, 
civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, 
administrative, or Government Accounting Office 
Report, hearing audit, or investigation, or from 
the news media, unless the action is brought by 
the Attorney General or the person bringing the 
action is an original source of the information. 
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, 'original 
source' means an individual who has direct and 
independent knowledge of the information on 
which the allegations are based and has volunta-
rily provided the information to the Government 
before filing an action under this section which is 
based on the information. 
B. ApPLICATION TO WANG'S SUIT 
In granting summary judgment against Wang's False Claims 
Act claims, the district court stated that 
[w]ith respect to most of the evidence offered by 
Wang, he is not an "original source" and thus has 
failed to satisfy the requirements of the False 
Claims Act as a matter of law. The evidence for 
which he is the original source is simply insuffi-
cient to support the claim that the Act was 
violated. DD 
Section 3730(e)(4) was the basis of the district court's ruling. 
53. Id. at 23, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5288 ("The [Senate Judiciary) Committee's over-
all intent in amending the qui tam section of the False Claims Act is to encourage more 
private enforcement suits."). 
54. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1986). 
55. Wang v. FMC Corp., No. C-87-20814-WAI, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6683 at *5 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 1991). 
8
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Wang alleged fraud on four different projects, one of which 
was the Bradley Fighting Vehicle.1I6 This is the project of 
interest in the following discussion. 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that, 
in his allegations about the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Wang had 
to, and did not, satisfy section 3730(e)(4)'s original source 
requirement.1I7 
1. Original Source Requirement: Direct and Independent 
Knowledge 
To meet the original source requirement of 3730(e)(4), 
Wang must have "direct and independent knowledge of the in-
formation on which the allegations are based."lIs 
The district court ruled that Wang was not the original 
source of the Bradley information because that information had 
been publicly disclosed. liB "[U]nder Houck, this evidence cannot 
be 'direct and independent' and thus cannot serve as proof of a 
violation of the False Claims Act. "60 
Houck was an attorney who represented late claimants to 
money set aside pursuant to a settlement order in a huge anti-
trust case.61 In his suit, he alleged that the funds were being dis-
tributed in a way prohibited by the Seventh Circuit.62 The Sev-
56. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1417. The other three allegations are of lesser interest. The 
court found that the source material on which Wang based these three complaints had 
not been previously publicly revealed, and therefore his suits were not jurisdictionally 
barred. 975 F.2d at 1416. But the suit failed on the merits because Wang "failed to 
produce sufficient evidence to support an inference of fraud by FMC." 975 F.2d at 1420. 
Under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) and 3729(b), Wang had to prove that FMC acted "know-
ingly" (with actual knowledge, in deliberate ignorance of the truth, or in reckless disre-
gard of the truth). "Innocent mistake is a defense to the criminal charge or civil com-
plaint. So is mere negligence." United States ex rei. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water 
Agency, 929 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). The Wang court held 
that "[f]or each of his surviving claims, Wang has no evidence that FMC committed 
anything more than 'innocent mistakes' or 'negligence,' if that." 975 F.2d at 1420. 
57. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1417-20. 
58. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (e)(4)(B) (1986). 
59. Wang, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6683. 
60. Id. at *5. 
61. Houck on Behalf of United States v. Folding Carton Admin. Comm., 881 F.2d 
494 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990). 
62. Houck, 881 F.2d at 503-04. 
9
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enth Circuit held that Houck's knowledge of the Administration 
Committee's practices was direct, by virtue of his direct relation-
ship to, and interest in, the litigation.68 
However, the Seventh Circuit also decided that Houck's 
knowledge was not independent of the public disclosure of the 
Committee's distribution method.6• He could have learned what 
the Committee was doing from the Committee's public notices.6& 
The court therefore ruled that Houck did not meet the original 
source requirement and affirmed the district court's dismissal of 
his suit.66 
In Wang, the Ninth Circuit ruled that Houck stood for a 
narrower proposition than the one advanced by the district 
court: 
The district court, purporting to follow Houck . .. 
held that Wang's knowledge was not "direct and 
independent." This was error .... Wang had per-
sonal knowledge of Bradley's transmission 
problems because he worked (however briefly) on 
trying to fix them. The fact that someone else 
publicly disclosed the Bradley'S transmission 
problems does not rob Wang of what he saw with 
his own eyes. Wang's knowledge of the transmis-
sion problems was "direct and independent" be-
cause it was unmediated by anything but Wang's 
own labor. 
2. Original Source Requirement: Voluntarily Provided the In-
formation to the Government 
To meet 3730(e)(4)'s original source requirement, Wang 
must also show that he "has voluntarily provided the informa-
tion to the Government before filing an action under this section 
which is based on the information. "67 
There is no indication, in the district and appellate opinions 




67. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (e)(4)(B). 
10
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or in the parties' appellate briefs68 that Wang did not volunta-
rily provide the information to the government. 
3. The Whistleblower Requirement 
Even though Wang had direct and independent knowledge 
of information that he voluntarily revealed to the government, 
the Ninth Circuit was dissatisfied because Wang was "revealing 
what is already publicly known."69 The court identified United 
States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. 
Prudential Insurance CO.70 as a particularly detailed review of 
the history of the False Claims Act.71 Citing Stinson, the Wang 
court stated that "[t]he paradigm qui tam plaintiff is the 
'whistleblowing insider.' "72 A whistleblower reveals 'damaging 
information that is not yet publicly known,73 and therefore 
Wang was not a whistle blower. ,Someone else revealed the 
problems with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle: "[i]f there is to be a 
bounty for disclosing those troubles, it should go to the one who 
in fact helped to bring them· to light"74 not, the court held, to 
Wang.711 
According to the statutory wording, an original source must 
have "direct and independent knowledge" and must have "vol-
untarily provided the information . . . to the Government. "76 
There is no whistle blower requirement in the text of the stat-
ute.77 This additional requirement was read into the statute by 
the Wang court, and by the court in United States ex rel. Dick 
v. Long Island Lighting Co., as mandated by the legislative in-
68. Appellant's Corrected Opening Brief on Appeal; Brief of Appellee FMC Corpo-
ration in Opposition to Appellant's Opening Brief on Appeal; Appellant's Reply Brief 
(No. 91-15789). 
69. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1418. 
70. 944 F.2d 1149, 1152-54, 1162-68 (3rd Cir. 1991). 
71. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1418. The court also referred readers to United States ex rei. 
Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991), for a 
detailed discussion of the history of the Act. 
72. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1419. 
73. [d. 
74. [d. at 1421. 
75. [d. 
76. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (e)(4)(B) (1986). 
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tent of Congress.78 
As an example of the legislative intent, the Dic'k court cited 
a statement by Representative Berman, one of the drafters of 
the Act, that an original source has "some of the information 
related to the claim which he made available to the government 
or the news media in advance of the false claims being publicly 
disclosed."79 Also, Senator Grassley, who introduced the legisla-
tion in the Senate, stated that the original source requirements 
barred suits by anyone "who had not been an original source to 
the entity that disclosed the allegations."8o Finally, the Dick 
court quoted the House Report's statement of the purpose of the 
qui tam provisions: "to encourage private individuals who are 
aware of fraud being perpetrated against the Government to 
bring such information forward. "81 
The Wang court cited Dick with approval82 and added fur-
ther legislative history: "the 1986 amendments are meant 'to en-
courage any individual knowing of Government fraud to bring 
that information forward.'83 The Ninth Circuit concluded its 
analysis by stating that: 
It is important to note that under the rule we 
adopt today, all those who "directly or indirectly" 
disclose an allegation might qualify as its original 
source .... If, however, someone republishes an 
allegation that already has been publicly dis-
closed, he cannot bring a qui tam suit, even if he 
had "direct and independent knowledge" of the 
fraud. He is no "whistleblower." A 
"whistleblower" sounds the alarm; he does not 
echo it. The Act rewards those brave enough to 
speak in the face of a "conspiracy of silence," and 
not their mimics."84 
78. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1419; Dick, 912 F.2d at 16. 
79. Dick, 912 F.2d at 17 (emphasis original) (citing 132 CONGo REC. H9389 (daily ed. 
October 7, 1986)). 
80. [d. (emphasis in original) (citing 132 CONGo REC. S20,536 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 
1986)). 
81. Dick, 912 F.2d at 18 (citing HR REP. No. 660, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1986)). 
82. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1419. 
83. [d. (citing S. REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267). 
84. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1419 (citations omitted). 
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III. CRITIQUE 
The legislative history of the Act is not so clear as it might 
seem in the analyses811 of United States ex rel. Dick v. Long 
Island Lighting CO.86 and Wang v. FMC Corp.8? 
The Wang court highlighted United States ex rei. Stinson, 
Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Insurance CO.88 
as a source of detailed discussion of the history of the False 
Claims Act.88 The Stinson majority had this to say about the 
legislative history of the 1986 amendment: "[t]he bill that even-
tuated in the 1986 amendments underwent substantial revisions 
during its legislative path. This provides ample opportunity to 
search the legislative history and find some support somewhere 
for almost any construction of the many ambiguous terms in the 
final version. "90 
A. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY DOES NOT UNAMBIGUOUSLY Ex-
CLUDE NON-WHISTLEBLOWING ORIGINAL SOURCES 
A leading review of the history of the 1986 amendments to 
the False Claims Act says this about the' original sourc~ require-
ment: "It is interesting that for such a significant portion of the 
Amendment, its legislative history is virtually non-existent."91 
According to the Senate Report published as the legislative 
history of the False Claims Amendments Act of 1986,92 the 
amendments were geared toward several related purposes, in-
cluding the following: "[t]he purpose ... is to enhance the Gov-
ernment's ability to recover losses sustained as a result of fraud 
against the government."9S The purpose is "to encourage any in-
dividual knowing of Government fraud to bring that information 
85. See supra notes 69-84 and accompanying text. 
86. 912 F.2d 13 (2nd Cir. 1990), 
87. Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992). 
88. 944 F.2d 1149, 1152-54, 1162-68 (3d Cir. 1991). 
89. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1418. 
90. Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1154. 
91. Richard J. Oparil, The Coming Impact of the Amended False Claims Act, 22 
AKRON L, REV, 525, 548 (1989). 
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forward. "94 "The Committee's overall intent in amending the 
qui tam section of the False Claims Act is to encourage more 
private enforcement suits. "911 
The Wang court wrote that the False Claims Act "rewards 
those brave enough to speak in the face of a 'conspiracy of si-
lence' and not their mimics. Senate Report at 6, 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5271."96 The Senate Report often referred to a 
"conspiracy of silence" or, more generally, to the desirability of 
encouraging whistleblowing.97 However, the report did not ex-
plicitly state on page 6, or on any other page, that qui tam suits 
should only be filed by whistle blowers ("and not their 
mimics"98). 
The original source requirement discussed in the Senate Re-
port is slightly different from 31 U.S.C. 3730 (e)(4)-the Senate 
Report says that: 
[P]aragraph 4 disallows jurisdiction for qui tam 
actions based on allegations disclosed in a crimi-
nal, civil or administrative hearing, a congres-
sional or General Accounting Office report or 
hearing, or from the news media, unless the ac-
tion is brought 6 months after the public disclos-
ure and the Government has failed to take any 
action.BB 
In other words, in the version of the bill described in the 
Senate Report, "mimics"100 were explicitly allowed to bring suit 
six months after public disclosure. 101 
New subsection (e)(4) of section 3730 prohibits a 
suit based solely on previous public disclosures 
unless the Government has failed to act within 6 
94. [d. at 2, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N at 5266-67. 
95. [d. at 23, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5288-89. 
96. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1419. 
97. See, e.g., S. REP. at 2, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5266-67; S. REP. at 4, 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5269; S. REP. at 5, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5270; S. REP. at 6, 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5271; S. REP. at 14, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5279; S. REP. at 25, 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5290; S. REP. at 34-35, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5299-5300. 
98. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1419. 
99. S. REP. at 30, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5295. 
100. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1419. 
101. [d. 
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months of the public disclosure. The Committee 
recognizes that guaranteeing monetary compensa-
tion for individuals in this category could result in 
inappropriate windfalls where the relator's in-
volvement with the evidence is indirect at 
best. . . . The Committee believes a financial 
reward is justified in these circumstances if but 
for the relator's suit, the Government may not 
have recovered." (Emphasis added.)102 
293 
The six month time limit does not appear in 31 U.S.C. § 
3730 (e)(4).I03 Only the Attorney General or a person who is an 
original source of the information can bring the suit, not some-
one who obtained the information from public sources. I04 But 
the removal of this provision does not tell us whether Congress 
intended to imply a third requirement into the definition of 
"original source,"IOIi that the source be a whistleblower.lo6 
The Senate Report also stated the following: 
Perhaps the most serious problem plaguing effec-
tive enforcement is a lack of resources on the part 
of Federal enforcement agencies. . . . Allegations 
that perhaps could develop into very significant 
cases are often left unaddressed at the outset due 
to a judgment that devoting scarce resources to a 
questionable case may not be efficient. . . . The 
Committee believes that the amendments . . . 
which allow and encourage assistance from the 
private citizenry can make a significant impact on 
bolstering the Government's fraud enforcement 
effort.lo7 
Desirable assistance might come from a qui tam plaintiff 
whether or not that plaintiff was the first person to reveal the 
damaging information. Because the Judiciary Committee's "in-
tent in amending the qui tam [provisions was] to encourage 
102. S. REP. at 28, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5293. 
103. See Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1163-69 (Scirica, J., dissenting), for an extended dis-
cussion of the evolution of the wording of the original source requirement. 
104. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (e)(4)(A) (1986). 
105. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (e)(4)(B) (1986). 
106. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. 
107. S. REP. at 7, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5272. 
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more private enforcement suits,"108 a reasonable reader could 
conclude that Congress intended the definition of "original 
source" to be read broadly to include sources who are not 
whistle blowers. 
B. SUITS LIKE WANG'S MAY NOT BE PARASITIC 
"One difficulty in interpreting the 1986 amendments is that 
Congress was never completely clear about what kind of 'para-
sitic' suits it was attempting to avoid."I09 
In United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,llo the government 
recovered a $54,000 fine from the defendant in a criminal prose-
cutionlll and an additional $150,000 from a qui tam suitll2 that 
is generallyll3 cited as the trigger for restrictions on "para-
sitic"IH lawsuits. Arguably, the government benefited in this 
case. The problem, though, is that if bounty hunters can file qui 
tam suits as soon as they read about a government investigation 
or prosecution, the government is forced to file its civil suit 
early.IUi Otherwise, it will have to split the proceeds with the 
bounty hunter(s). These "unseemly races [to the courthouse] for 
the opportunity of profiting from the government's investiga-
tions"1l8 are undesirable. ll7 The jurisdictional bar, restricting 
qui tam suits to plaintiffs who are original sources, was intended 
to eliminate parasitic lawsuits.1l8 
However, the original source requirement has gone beyond 
eliminating parasitic lawsuits: it has been used to bar suits in at 
108. S. REP. at 23-24, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5288-89. 
109. Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1163 (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
110. 317 U.S. 537 (1942). 
111. [d. at 545. 
112. [d. 
113. See, e.g., Wang, 975 F.2d at 1418; S. REP. at 10-11, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5275-
76. 
114. Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1163 (Scirica, J., dissenting); James B. Helmer, Jr. & Rob-
ert Clark Neff, Jr., War Stories: A History of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False 
Claims Act, the 1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act, and their Applications in 
the United States ex rei. Gravitt v. General Electric Co. Litigation, 18 OHIO N.U. L. 
REV. 35, 38 (1991). 
115. S. REP. at 10-11, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5275-76. 
116. Marcus, 317 U.S. at 547. 
117. S. REP. at 10, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5275. 
118. Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1163 (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
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least two cases (Stinson1l9 and Dick120 ) in which the government 
had not filed suit and would not otherwise recover any money. 
There is no indication of other pending legislation in the Wang 
court opinions and appellate briefs.12l Because Wang's allega-
tions related to events in 1983,122 Wang's suit was probably the 
last opportunity for the government to recover damages from 
these events. Therefore Wang's suit was arguably not undesir-
able nor parasitic. 
C. FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1992 
On August 11, 1992, the House of Representatives passed 
H.R. 4563, the False Claims Amendments Act of 1992.123 The 
bill amends § 3730(e)(4) to eliminate the ambiguity of the origi-
nal source requirement.124 
The accompanying report, from the House Committee on 
119. See Robert L. Vogel, Eligibility Requirements for Relators Under Qui Tam 
Provisions of the False Claims Act, 21 PUB. CONT. L.J. 593, 604-05 (1992). 
. 120. [d. at 603. 
121. Appellant's Corrected Opening Brief on Appeal; Brief of Appellee FMC Corpo-
ration in Opposition to Appellant's Opening Brief on Appeal; Appellant's Reply Brief 
(No. 91-15789). 
122. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1412. 
123. 138 CONGo REC. H7978, H7980 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1992). 
124. The new language for the jurisdictional bar, 31 U.S.C. 3730(e)(4) reads as 
follows: 
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action brought under 
subsection (b) in which all of the material facts and allegations 
are obtained from a news media report or reports, or a disclos-
ure to the general public of a document or documents-
(i) created by the Federal Government; 
(ii) filed in a lawsuit to which the Federal Government is 
a party; or 
(iii) relating to an open and active investigation by the 
Federal Government; 
unless the person brin{ting the action is an original source of 
such facts and allegations. 
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, an individual is an 'origi-
nal source' of material facts and allegations if such individual 
has knowledge, independent from the sources listed in subpar-
agraph (A), of such facts and allegations and has voluntarily 
provided them to the Government. The person bringing the 
action shall also be considered' an original source of any mate-
rial facts or allegations developed as a result of information 
provided to the Government by that person. 
138 CONGo REC. H7979 (daily ed. August 11, 1992). 
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the Judiciary, l2II states: 
This amendment should eliminate any ambiguity 
in the statute which would lead a court to con-
clude that there are any additional requirements 
for qualifying as an original source. One court, for 
example, concluded that in addition to having in-
dependent knowledge of the information and pro-
viding it to the government to qualify as an origi-
nal source, the plaintiff also "must have directly 
or indirectly been a source to the entity that pub-
licly disclosed the allegations on which a suit is 
based." United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island 
Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1990).128 
The amendment clarifies that an original source is 
not required to be a direct or independent source 
to the entity that discloses the allegations.127 
The report also states that the Third Circuit's majority 
opinion misconstrued the original source provision when it 
barred information obtained during discovery in a previous law-
suit in Stinson. 128 
H.R. 4563 is not yet law because it has not yet been passed 
by the Senate Judiciary Committee or by the Senate.12S If it be-
comes law in its present form, it will overrule Wang. 
There is some reason to wonder whether H.R. 4563's 
amendments to the original source requirement will come 
through the Senate without amendment. On October 3, 1992, 
the Senate passed S. 2652 (Health Care Fraud Prosecution 
Act).lso The bill contains original source restrictions similar to 
the False Claims Act, but defines an "original source" as "a per-
son who has direct and independent knowledge of the informa-
tion that is furnished and has voluntarily provided the informa-
125. H. R. REP. No. 837, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1992). 
126. The report cited only Dick, and not also Wang, because Wang was not filed for 
another month. 
127. H.R. Rep. at 14. 
128. Id. at 8. 
129. A check of the BC database on Westlaw on January 18, 1993 indicated that the 
bill had not passed the Senate Judiciary Committee or the Senate, but the "Odds that 
bill will pass" these stages were rated at 100% and 95% respectively. 
130. 138 CONGo REC. S16,526 (daily ed. October 3, 1992). According to the BC 
database on Westlaw, this bill has not yet passed the House Judiciary Committee. 
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tion to the Government prior to disclosure by the news 
media. "131 If the qui tam original source definition were worded 
this way, it would accord with Dick and Wang and contradict 
the wording of H.R. 4563.132 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In their appellate briefs, the parties did not consider 
whether a party had to be a paradigmatic whistle blower to be an 
original source of False Claims Act information.133 Wang argued 
that he was an original source because he was disclosing previ-
ously undisclosed information.134 FMC argued that it had not 
committed fraud, that Wang's evidence did not support an infer-
ence of fraud, and that Wang submitted too little independent, 
non-public evidence to be considered an original source.131i 
Neither party argued that Wang could have had direct and inde-
pendent knowledge of the allegations, have reported them to the 
government, but still not be an original source because he was 
not involved in making them public. Neither party reviewed the 
Act's legislative history around this issue or corrected the other 
party's review. La:cking the benefit of this adversarial analysis, 
the Wang 136 court's holding might reasonably be subjected to a 
good-faith challenge. 
Vogel stated that Congress might amend the False Claims 
Act before his paper was published.137 There is no telling when 
the amendments will pass or what they will finally say. Until 
then, H.R. 4563 is yet another indication that Congress intended 
to allow suits like Wang's.138 Combined with legislative history 
of the 1986 amendments,139 a qui tam plaintiff's counsel has rea-
131. [d. (emphasis added). 
132. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text. 
133. Appellant's Corrected Opening Brief on Appeal; Brief of Appellee FMC Corpo-
ration in Opposition to Appellant's Opening Brief on Appeal; Appellant's Reply Brief 
(No. 91-15789). 
134. See, e.g., Appellant's Corrected Opening Brief on Appeal at 15. 
135. Brief of Appellee FMC Corporation in Opposition at 8-11. 
136. Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992). 
137. Robert L. Vogel, Eligibility Requirements for Relators Under Qui Tam Provi-
sions of the False Claims Act, 21 PUB. CONT. L.J. 593, 594 (1992). 
138. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text. 
139. See supra notes 90-122 and accompanying text. 
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son to argue that Dick140 and Wang should be ignored or 
overruled. 
However, the wording of S. 2652 suggests that Congress did 
intend to bar suits similar to Wang's. This is supported by the 
legislative history cited in Wang and Dick. 141 
Congress' intended definition of an "original source" is 
therefore ambiguous. Arguments can be made to support two 
conflicting interpretations. Interpreting Congressional intent is 
often a controversial process.142 When the intent is ambiguous 
and a "straightforward reading"143 of the statute is possible, 
there is reason to argue that the straightforward reading should 
prevail over a suggestion of a different Congressional intent. In 
the present case, the straightforward reading indicates that "a 
qui tam plaintiff must (1) have direct and independent knowl-
edge of the information on which the allegations are based, -and 
(2) have voluntarily provided the information to the govern-
ment."lH The additional requirement adopted by the Dick and 
Wang courts, that the plaintiff must be a whistle blower, was 
based on a review of questionable legislative intent. Though it 
carries significant moral force, I conclude that the addition of 
this requirement is inappropriate until Congress acts to clarify 
its intent. 
Cem Kaner, Ph.D. * 
140. United States ex rei. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13 (2nd Cir. 
1990). 
141. See supra notes 69-84 and accompanying text. 
142. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1988); George A. Costello, Aver-
age Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions",' The Relative Reliability of Commit-
tee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39 
(1990). 
143. Dick, 912 F.2d at 16. 
144. [d. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993. 
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